Seven Years On: Are Australia’s Corporate Whistleblower Laws Working?

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I Introduction

Australia substantially strengthened its corporate whistleblower protections in 2019.[i] Seven years later, the regime is undergoing its first statutory review, required by the 2019 reforms, with the Treasury considering whether it remains fit for purpose.[ii] The review examines issues including access to justice, administration and the regime's effectiveness in encouraging disclosures and deterring misconduct.[iii] It raises a timely question: are stronger legal protections enough, or is the greater challenge ensuring they work in practice?

II Protection in Practice

Australia's corporate whistleblower regime is principally contained in Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).[iv] The 2019 reforms consolidated and strengthened the framework, expanding who could make and receive protected disclosures and the remedies available.[v]

Broadly, protection applies where an eligible whistleblower has reasonable grounds to suspect misconduct or an improper state of affairs concerning a regulated entity and discloses it to an eligible recipient.[vi] Recipients include senior company personnel, auditors and authorised whistleblower services, as well as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (‘APRA’). Disclosures may be anonymous, with qualifying whistleblowers receiving confidentiality, liability and anti-detriment protections.[vii] Public companies and large proprietary companies must also have a whistleblower policy, intended to inform employees of their protections and encourage disclosure through appropriate channels.[viii]

The strength of the statutory framework depends partly on how those protections operate within companies. ASIC’s 2025 review of 134 companies, which reported receiving 8,095 disclosures between July 2024 and June 2025, found key differences in the maturity and operation of whistleblower programs across corporate Australia.[ix] Companies also reported that approximately 39% of disclosures made through whistleblower channels were ultimately considered ‘in scope’ for Corporations Act protection, highlighting the practical importance of correctly assessing disclosures when they are received.[x]

Implementation remains inconsistent. A quarter of surveyed companies did not provide regular whistleblower training, 30% did not routinely review their programs' effectiveness, and 58% had not sought employee feedback on their whistleblower program or speak-up culture.[xi] Further, ASIC found that companies with more mature practices generally had higher disclosure rates, although factors including industry, company size and company type also affected outcomes.[xii]

For companies, whistleblower disclosures have significance beyond formal compliance. ASIC observed that receiving disclosures can indicate trust in internal processes and employees' willingness to raise concerns, helping companies identify issues that might otherwise remain undetected.[xiii]

III Whistleblowing and Corporate Decision-Making

ASIC v TerraCom Ltd (No 3) illustrates the consequences where a company’s response to a disclosure itself causes detriment.[xiv] Justin Williams, TerraCom’s former General Manager Commercial, raised concerns that coal-quality results had been amended without proper justification before certificates were issued to customers.[xv] TerraCom admitted that Williams was an eligible whistleblower and had made a qualifying disclosure.[xvi]

TerraCom then published three announcements characterising Williams' allegations as ‘false’ and ‘unfounded’, including an open letter stating that he had sought a $5 million payment.[xvii] TerraCom admitted that the announcements caused Williams hurt, humiliation, distress, embarrassment, and reputational damage, including by portraying him as someone willing to make unfounded allegations of serious wrongdoing for personal gain.[xviii] It also admitted that its belief or suspicion that Williams may have made a qualifying disclosure formed part of the reason for publishing the announcements.[xix] The Federal Court imposed a $7.5 million pecuniary penalty and ordered TerraCom to pay $1 million towards ASIC’s costs.[xx] The case demonstrates that a company's response to a whistleblower can itself generate legal exposure, independently of whether every underlying allegation is ultimately established.[xxi]

Reiche v Neometals Ltd provides an important contrast to TerraCom (No 3).[xxii] Reiche raised several concerns within the business, culminating in a formal whistleblower disclosure in July 2024.[xxiii] His role was later made redundant as part of a broader restructure, raising the question of whether his whistleblowing had influenced that decision.[xxiv]

The Full Federal Court held that a decision-maker does not need to appreciate that a disclosure is legally protected under Part 9.4AAA.[xxv] The relevant question is whether the decision-maker believed or suspected that the person had raised or might raise concerns about misconduct or an improper state of affairs, and whether that belief materially influenced the detrimental decision.[xxvi] The belief or suspicion must be a ‘substantial and operative’ factor, not merely part of the background.[xxvii] For companies, Reiche highlights the importance of establishing who made an adverse decision, what they knew and why the decision was made when a known whistleblower is affected.[xxviii]

IV Making Protection Work

The review should assess whether existing protections can be effectively accessed and implemented.[xxix] Access to remedies is one clear challenge. Regulatory enforcement is discretionary, and regulators are not required to represent whistleblowers or seek compensation on their behalf.[xxx] Whistleblowers generally need to pursue their own proceedings for individual remedies, which are typically not publicly funded.[xxxi] Although the Corporations Act limits adverse costs orders against whistleblowers, Treasury is expressly asking whether compensation and remedy processes could be improved.[xxxii]

ASIC's findings on training, program review and employee feedback also demonstrate uneven implementation across corporate Australia.[xxxiii] Improving existing frameworks may therefore be as important as expanding statutory rights.

The review also exposes gaps in the channels through which protected disclosures can be made. Treasury notes, for example, that a whistleblower reporting suspected anti-competitive conduct directly to the ACCC would not receive Corporations Act whistleblower protection, even though the conduct falls within the ACCC's regulatory remit.[xxxiv]

Financial rewards for corporate whistleblowers are a more contested reform.[xxxv] US schemes offer one potential model, with proponents arguing that rewards encourage disclosure of otherwise hidden misconduct.[xxxvi] Treasury, however, questions whether rewards would justify their cost, noting the risk of increased low-value disclosures and pressure on regulatory resources.[xxxvii] Their value in the Australian regime therefore remains an open question.

V Conclusion

Australia’s corporate whistleblower laws are stronger than they were seven years ago, but their effectiveness in practice remains uneven. ASIC’s findings and the issues now before the Treasury suggest that access to remedies, implementation and targeted statutory gaps remain important areas for reform. For companies, the message is clear: effective whistleblowing is not merely compliance, but an important part of corporate governance and risk management.

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References

[i] Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 (Cth).

[ii] Department of the Treasury (Cth), Review of Tax and Corporate Whistleblowing in Australia (Consultation Paper, June 2026) 3-4 (‘Treasury Consultation Paper’).

[iii] Ibid 3.

[iv] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 9.4AAA (‘Corporations Act’).

[v] Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 4; Watson v Greenwoods & Herbert Smith Freehills Pty Ltd (2023) 413 ALR 227, 234–5 [15] (‘Watson’).

[vi] Corporations Act (n 4) ss 1317AA, 1317AAA–1317AAC; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Whistleblower Rights and Protections (Information Sheet 238).

[vii] Corporations Act (n 4) ss 1317AA–1317AB, 1317AC–1317AE; Watson (n 5) [13]–[15].

[viii] Corporations Act (n 4) s 1317AI; Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 25–6.

[ix] Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Insights from the ASIC Whistleblower Questionnaire: July 2024 to June 2025 (Report 827, December 2025) 3–4 (‘ASIC Report 827’).

[x] Ibid 10.

[xi] Ibid 4, 21–2, 25–7.

[xii] Ibid 4, 8–9, 32–4.

[xiii] Ibid 3, 8.

[xiv] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v TerraCom Ltd (No 3) [2025] FCA 1017 (‘TerraCom (No 3)’).

[xv] Ibid [9]–[10].

[xvi] Ibid [23]–[25].

[xvii] Ibid [14]–[16]. 

[xviii] Ibid [26].

[xix] Ibid [28], [51].

[xx] Ibid [3]–[4].

[xxi] TerraCom (No 3) (n 14) [23]–[28], [45]–[51].

[xxii] Reiche v Neometals Ltd [2026] FCAFC 53 (‘Reiche’).

[xxiii] Ibid [8].

[xxiv] Ibid [3], [8], [11]–[12], [27].

[xxv] Ibid [47]–[52].

[xxvi] Ibid [52], [54]–[58].

[xxvii] Ibid [91]–[107].

[xxviii] Ibid [36]–[39], [85]–[87], [106]–[107].

[xxix] Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 3.

[xxx] Ibid 5–6.

[xxxi] Ibid 6.

[xxxii] Corporations Act (n 4) s 1317AH; Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 18–19.

[xxxiii] ASIC Report 827 (n 9) 4, 21–2, 25–7.

[xxxiv] Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 14–15.

[xxxv] Ibid 22–4.

[xxxvi] Ibid 22–3; The Australia Institute, Whistleblowing While You Work: Using Rewards for Whistleblowing to Uncover White-Collar Crime (Discussion Paper, October 2024) 18-24.

[xxxvii] Treasury Consultation Paper (n 2) 22–3.